Abstract-With the explosive growth in computers and the growing scarcity in electric supply, reduction of energy consumption in large-scale computing systems has become a paramount research issue. In this paper, we study the problem of allocation of tasks onto a computational grid, with the aim to simultaneously minimize the energy consumption and the makespan subject to the constraints of deadlines and tasks' architectural requirements. We propose a solution from cooperative game theory based on the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In this cooperative game, machines collectively arrive at a decision that describes the task allocation that is collectively best for the system, ensuring that the allocations are both energy and makespan optimized. Through rigorous mathematical proofs we show that the proposed cooperative game in mere Oðnm logðmÞÞ time (where n is the number of tasks, and m is the number of machines in the system) produces a NBS that guarantees Pareto optimally. The simulation results show that the proposed technique achieves superior performance compared to the Greedy and Linear Relaxation (LR) heuristics and with competitive performance relative to the optimal solution implemented in LINDO for small-scale problems.
NERGY consumption is widely recognized to be a critical problem in large-scale computing systems, such as computational grids because they consume massive amounts of energy and have high cooling costs [9] . These systems must be designed to meet functional and timing requirements while being energy efficient [32] . A computational grid is composed of a set of heterogeneous machines, which may be geographically distributed heterogeneous multiprocessors that exploit task-level parallelism in applications. Resource allocation in grids is already a challenging problem due to the need to address deadline constraints and system heterogeneity. The problem becomes more challenging when energy management is an additional design objective because energy consumption of the system must be carefully balanced against other performance measures [32] . The traditional research on resource allocation and scheduling deals with fixed CPU speed and performance optimization only and hence does not suit the performance-energy optimization problem. Energy management can be achieved by regulating the instantaneous power consumption by using Dynamic Power Management (DPM) [21] or Dynamic Voltage Scaling (DVS) [30] . This DPM approach brings a processor into a power-down mode, where only certain parts of the computer system (e.g., clock generation and time circuits) are kept running, while the processor is in an idle state. The DVS approach exploits the convex relation between the CPU supply voltage and power consumption. The rationale behind the DVS technique is to stretch out task execution time through CPU frequency and voltage reduction.
In this paper, we study the energy-aware task allocation (EATA) problem for assigning a set of tasks onto the machines of a computational grid each equipped with DVS feature. Because the DVS modules can only alter instantaneous power, the energy consumption of a task on a machine is the task's execution time interval multiplied by the instantaneous power of the machine. We formulate the EATA problem as a multiconstrained multiobjective extension of the Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP). EATA is then solved using a novel solution from cooperative game theory based on the celebrated Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) [15] ; we shall acronym this solution concept as NBS-EATA. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that addresses the problem of energy-aware resource management in computational grids using game theory.
Contribution synopsis. The development of the model and the solution method for the EATA problem consists of the following:
. A problem is formulated to minimize the instantaneous power (and consequently the energy consumption) and the makespan, while maintaining certain performance requirements such as deadline constraints and tasks' architectural requirements for certain machines. This formulation is done at the system level and corresponds to a high complexity min-min-max optimization problem (details can be found in Section 3.1).
. Using elegant cooperative game theoretical techniques, namely, the multiobjective convex programming (see Theorem 3), we transform the min-min-max problem into a low-complexity max-max-min optimization problem (the details can be found in Section 5.1). The immense advantage of this conversation besides the low complexity is that we can always guarantee that the max-max-min optimization problem has a Bargaining Point and subsequently results in Pareto optimality. We define Pareto optimality as follows: Given a set of alternative solutions, a movement from one solution to another that can make at least one solution better off without making any others worse off is called a Pareto improvement. A solution is Pareto optimal when no further Pareto improvements can be made. . Although the transformed max-max-min optimization problem can be solved to guarantee the existence of a Bargaining Point, the classical cooperative game theoretical techniques, namely, the Nash axiomatic technique [15] , cannot be directly used to identify the Bargaining Point for the reasons of slow convergence rate and high complexity [19] . The classical Nash axiomatic technique precedes the seminal solution concept of cooperative games, termed the NBS. Nash in his original paper showed that the classical Nash axiomatic technique can be used to provide a solution for any cooperative game [16] . . For the reasons of slow convergence rate and high complexity of the classical Nash axiomatic technique, our proposed cooperative game theoretical technique utilizes the Lagrangian multiplier technique to derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the multiobjective convex problem based on the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see Theorems 5 and 6), in order to identify the Bargaining Point in a fast turnaround time. We show the effectiveness of the Lagrangian-based NBS method by also comparing it with the classical Nash axiomatic technique (Section 5.3), as well as by experimental results. . Using simulation and theoretical analysis, the proposed NBS-EATA game is also compared against the optimal solution implemented in LINDO [22] , the Greedy [32] and Linear Relaxation (LR) [32] heuristics. The rest of the paper organization is given as follows: A brief discussion of related work is presented in Section 2. The EATA problem formulation and background information are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 provides some essential information pertaining to cooperative games. In Section 5, we model a cooperative game played among the machines for task allocation with the objective to simultaneously minimize energy consumption and makespan. Simulation results and concluding remarks are provided in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
RELATED WORK
Most DPM techniques utilize instantaneous power management features supported by hardware. For example, in [1] , the authors extend the operating system's power manager by an adaptive power manager (APM) that uses the processor's DVS capabilities to reduce or increase the CPU frequency, thereby minimizing the overall energy consumption [3] . The DVS technique at the processor-level together with a turn on/off technique at the cluster-level to achieve high-power savings while maintaining the response time is proposed in [7] . In [20] , the authors introduce a scheme to concentrate the workload on a limited number of servers in a cluster such that the rest of the servers can remain switched-off for a longer time.
While the closest techniques to combining device power models to build a whole system has been presented in [8] , our approach aims at building a general framework for autonomic power and performance management, where we bring together and exploit existing device power management techniques from a whole system's perspective. Furthermore, while most power management techniques are either heuristic-based approaches [9] , [10] , [11] , [17] , [25] or stochastic optimization techniques [6] , [22] , [24] , [30] , we use game theory to seek radically fast and efficient solutions compared to the traditional approaches, e.g., heuristics, genetic algorithms, linear and dynamic programming, and branch and bound.
PROBLEM FORMULATION

Background Information
The following captures the power consumption in CMOS circuits:
where V , f, and C EF F are the supply voltage, clock frequency, and effective switched capacitance of the circuits, respectively. It is to be understood that the time to finish an operation is inversely proportional to the clock frequency [32] . This relationship can be extended to gather an insight on the energy consumption of the processor by simply recalling that energy is power multiplied by time. Therefore, the energy per operation, E op , is proportional to V 2 . This implies that lowering the supply voltage will reduce the energy consumption of the system in a quadratic fashion. However, lowering the supply voltage also decreases the maximum achievable clock speed. More specifically, f is (approximately) linearly proportional to V [2] :
Running the device's CPU at a slower frequency can significantly reduce a computing device's instantaneous power consumption. Reducing the supply voltage in conjunction with the clock frequency eliminates the idle cycles and saves the energy significantly. We have
because f1t À1 , where t is the time to complete an operation. Thus, the reduction of the supply voltage would reduce the energy dissemination; it would substantially slow down the time to complete an operation.
As reported in [32] , from (1), (2) , and (3), it is apparent that one can reduce quadratically the energy consumption or cubically the instantaneous power consumption, at the expense of linearly increased delay (reduced speed). These relationships seem to be a bit exaggerated, because 1) the relationships are not continuous, they rather progresses as a stepwise function relative to the scaling of the voltage and 2) the power or energy consumed by the processor does not take into account the amount of power or energy spent on memory accesses that in any computational environment is a necessary condition. As mentioned in [2] , the frequency of a processor is approximately proportional to the supply voltage; hence, all the subsequent relationships in (2) and (3) are a mere approximation.
The System Model
The system is a collection of machines that comprise the computational grid and the collection of tasks.
Machines. Consider a computational grid comprising of a set of machines, M ¼ fm 1 ; m 2 ; . . . ; m m g. Assume that each machine is equipped with a DVS module. Each machine is characterized by 1) The frequency of the CPU, f j , given in cycles per unit time. With the help of a DVS, f j can vary from f . From frequency, it is easy to obtain the speed of the CPU, S j , which is approximately proportional to the frequency of the machine. (This relationship between speed and the frequency of a processor is a widespread approximation, e.g., [14] , [32] .) 2) The specific machine architecture, Aðm j Þ. The architecture would include the type of CPU, bus types, and speeds in GHz, I/O, and memory in bytes.
Tasks. Consider a metatask, T ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n g, where t i is a task. Each task is characterized by 1) The computational cycles, c i , that it needs to complete. The assumption here is that the c i is known a priori. 2) The specific machine architecture, Aðt i Þ, that it needs to complete its execution.
3) The deadline, d i , before it has to complete its execution. Moreover, we also assume that the metatask, T , also has a deadline, D, which is met if and only if the deadlines of all its tasks are met.
Preliminaries. Now, suppose we are given a computational grid and a metatask, T , and we are required to map T on the computational grid such that all the characteristics of the tasks and the deadline constraint of T are fulfilled. We term this fulfillment as a feasible task to machine mapping. A feasible task to machine mapping happens when 1) Each task t i 2 T can be mapped to at least one m j subject to all the constraints associated with each task-computational cycles, architecture, and deadline. 2) The deadline constraint of T is also satisfied.
The number of computational cycles required by t i to execute on m j is assumed to be a finite positive number, denoted by c ij . The execution time of t i under a constant speed S ij , given in cycles per second is t ij ¼ c ij =S ij . For the associated data and instructions of a task, we assume that the processor always retrieves it from the level-1 (primary) data cache. A task, t i , when executed on machine m j draws, p ij amount of instantaneous power. Lowering the instantaneous power will lower the CPU frequency and consequently will decrease the speed of the CPU and hence cause t i to possibly miss its deadline. For simplicity, assume that switching the overhead, the CPU frequency is minimal, and hence, ignored.
The architectural requirements of each task are recorded as a tuple with each element bearing a specific requirement, for instance, 1) what processor does the task require for its execution? 2) The architectural affinity matching of the task to the machine. We assume that the mapping of architectural requirements is a Boolean operation. That is, the architectural mapping is only fulfilled when all of the architectural constraints are satisfied, otherwise not.
Formulating the Min-Min-Max Problem
Given is a computation grid and a metatask T . Find the task to machine mapping, where 1) the cumulative instantaneous power utilized by the computational grid is minimized such that 2) the makespan of the metatask, T , is minimized.
Mathematically, we can say
p ij x ij and minimize max 1jm X n i¼1 t ij x ij subject to x ij 2 f0; 1g; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . m; ð4Þ
Constraint (4) is the mapping constraint, when x ij ¼ 1, a task, t i , is mapped to machine, m j . Constraint (5) elaborates on this mapping in conjunction to the architectural requirements, and it states that a mapping can only exists if the architecture is mapped. Constraint (6) relates to the fulfillment of the deadline of each task, and constraint (7) tells us about the Boolean relationship between the deadline and the actual time of execution of the tasks. Constraint (8) relates to the deadline constraints of the metatask that will hold if and only if all the deadlines of the tasks, d i , i ¼ 1; 2; . . . n, are satisfied. The above problem formulation is in a form of multiconstrained multiobjective optimization problem, where the preference is given to one optimization over the other. Because we are more interested in minimizing the instantaneous power consumption, we give preference to the first objective that is the instantaneous power consumption. This formulation is in the same form as that of a GAP except for constraints of (6), (7) , and (8). The major difference between EATA and GAP is that the capacity of resources in EATA, in terms of the utilization of instantaneous power, is defined in groups, whereas in the case of GAP, it is defined individually. The EATA problem is formulated as a multiobjective optimization problem. In the literature, there are two standard ways to tackle such problems: 1) optimize objectives concurrently and 2) optimize one objective first, then make that as a constraint of the second objective. To optimize objectives concurrently, the classical method to tackle such problems is to use Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian will converge the two (in our case) or multiple objectives to a saddle point [12] . To optimize one objective first, then make that as a constraint of the second objective, the only plausible framework is when one can ensure that the two objective functions have an acceptable overlap. However, the EATA problem has the objectives of optimizing instantaneous power and makespan that are opposite to each other. Therefore, we choose to optimize both the instantaneous power consumption and the makespan concurrently using the Lagrangian [23] .
An Example Scenario
Consider a satellite-based weather monitoring system. The system usually consists of three major components [27] : 1) a satellite scheduling system, 2) the satellite with its data collection sensors, and 3) the data processing system. The satellite scheduling system is responsible for issuing a request to the satellite about the data that must be collected and sends the same information to the data processing system. The satellite collects information about weather conditions on earth and transmits it back to the data processing system. The data sent down by the satellite must be processed before it can provide any value to the users.
The satellite scheduling system issues a request to the satellite to send down the collected weather data (during its orbital cycle around the earth) when it is directly above the base station. The base station is a facility that houses a computational grid to process the data sent down by the satellite and a data center to store all the processed data. This data is then sold to various agencies (news stations, research laboratories, and military departments) to perform various data analysis.
Because data is received periodically at the base station:
1. Data obtained from one orbital cycle of the satellite has to be processed before the arrival of the next set of data. 2. The base station has to maximize its revenue in order to keep the satellite up in orbit; hence, one feasible cost saving measure is to operate the computational grid, energy optimized. 3. Each news station is predominantly more interested in weather patterns within its vicinity. For instance, during the tornado session, the news stations in north Texas solely focus on weather patterns in the Texas panhandle and Oklahoma regions. Hence, the block data corresponding to the region of interest has to have an associated deadline so that the data is processed and available to the local news station in a timely fashion. 4. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Weather Service (NWS) on the other hand is primarily interested in obtaining the whole data set. Hence, the deadlines associated with block data will ensure that the entire data set is processed before the next time data is available to the base station. Moreover, because the data set is block based, the NWS does not have to wait for the whole data set to arrive, it can independently process the block data and use block overlapping [29] to construct the complete weather map of the Country.
BASICS OF COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
The two main branches of game theory are cooperative and noncooperative games. There has been a great rivalry in game theory between cooperative and noncooperative analysis. Although the five-sixth of "Theory of Games and Economic Behavior" [28] (the first text on game theory) is devoted to cooperative game theory, it is a noncooperative game theory, pioneered by Nash [16] and epitomized by the Nash equilibrium, which has held sway, largely due to the influence of economist and the strategic models that have developed in microeconomics and other fields. However, Nash equilibria have not proved completely satisfactory as a solution concept. Even though numerous refinements have been made in this concept, the most important being subgame perfection, consensus has not been reached on which refinements are most useful and in what strategic situations. Other notions of equilibrium, less myopic than Nash and grounded in theories that propose very different conceptions of a game and its rules of play, for instance, Backward Induction Equilibrium and Truel Equilibrium, have been useful but have not had widespread acceptance [18] .
Cooperative games offer several advantages over noncooperative games. First, it does not require a detailed specification of the moves of the players, the sequence in which they are made, who knows what about whom, and when, and so on. This descriptive detail is frequently missing in situations that we might consider to model. But, even when it is available, conclusions that can be derived about the optimal play are often highly game specific and nonrobust. Second, cooperative games are more robust in that their convergence to solution is more stable and, hence, less susceptible to swaying away from the equilibria. In contrast, noncooperative games are highly volatile as small changes in the strategy set, sequencing, or information conditions can lead to entirely different outcomes. Third, it is widely known in literature (e.g., [13] , [18] , and [28] ), that in a cooperative game, the performance of each player may be made better than the performance achieved in a noncooperative game at the Nash equilibrium.
Because the objective is to optimize the cumulative performance rather than to satisfy individual machines, we use cooperative game theory to solve the EATA problem. This collective benefit can be achieved very efficiently via the concept of NBS, which states that "An NBS is a solution to a game in which players use bargaining interactions to demand a portion of some entity. The interactions continue till a resolve is met and all the players achieve their demands." The remarkable property of the NBS is that it guarantees Pareto optimality. Thus, NBS provides an excellent solution to our problem because of the system environment (computational grid), the objective (collectively minimize makespan and instantaneous power consumption), the preference (Pareto optimality in terms of balancing the two objectives), and the additional requirements (allocation is fair on all the machines). In the following, we discuss the NBS.
A cooperative game. Assume that there are m players. Player j, j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; m, has f j ðxÞ as objective function. Each f j is a function from X to <, where X < L is a nonempty, closed, and convex set, and f j is bounded above by L, the dimension of the set (a positive integer).
0 m Þ be the minimal performance required by the players without cooperation when they enter the game. In simple words, 0 j represents a minimum performance guarantee that the system must provide to the player j.
0 is called the initial agreement point. The goal of a cooperative game is to conclude the game at a point that is at least agreeable as 0 . Let & < m be a nonempty convex and closed set, which is the set of achievable performances. Let G ¼ fð ; 0 Þj & < m g be a nonempty and bounded set, and 0 2 < m is such that
G is the set of achievable performances with respect to the initial agreement point.
Definition 1 (Pareto optimality). Assume x 2 X and fðxÞ ¼ ðf1ðxÞ; . . . ; fmðxÞÞ, fðxÞ 2 . Then, x is said to be Pareto optimal if for each
Pareto optimality is the key concept of NBS. In general, for an m player game, the set of Pareto optimal points form an m À 1 dimensional hypersurface consisting of an infinite number of points [19] . What is the desired operating point for our system among them? To answer this question, we need additional criteria for selecting the optimal point. Such criteria are the so-called fairness axioms that characterize the NBS.
Definition 2 (NBS) [26] . A mapping S: G ! < m is said to be a NBS if 1) Sð ; 0 Þ 2 0 and 2) Sð ; 0 Þ is Pareto optimal. Furthermore, the following axioms must be satisfied: 
Axioms 1-3, called the fairness axioms, explains the following: The NBS is unchanged if the performance objectives are proportionally scaled (Axiom 1). The Bargaining Point is not affected by enlarging the domain of strategies, which in turn would enlarge set G (Axiom 2). Players with the same initial points and objectives will obtain the same performance (Axiom 3).
Definition 3 (Bargaining solutions).
Ã is a Bargaining Point if it is given by Sð ; 0 Þ. We call f À1 ð Ã Þ the set of bargaining solutions.
Theorem 1 (Bargaining Point) [26] . Let X be a convex compact subset of < L . Let f j : X ! <, i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; m, be a concave functions, bounded above by L. Let fðxÞ ¼ ðf 1 ðxÞ; f 2 ðxÞ; . . . f m ðxÞÞ, ¼ f 2 < m j9x 2 X; fðxÞ ! g, XðÞ ¼ fx 2 XjfðxÞ ! g, and X Ã ¼ Xð 0 Þ be the set of strategies that enable the players to achieve at least their initial performances. Then, there exists a bargaining solution and a unique Bargaining Point Ã .
The set of the bargaining solutions
Þ is determined as follows: Let J be the set of players able to achieve the performance strictly superior to their initial performance, i.e., J ¼ fj 2 f1; 2; . . . ; mgj 9x 2 X 0 ; f j ðxÞ > 0 j g. Each vector x in the bargaining solution set verifies f j ðxÞ > 0 j , for all j 2 J. The problem is to find the bargaining solution by identifying a vector X Ã that maximizes the following:
Hence, Ã satisfies
From the assumption on J, the product is positive. The players outside of J are not considered in the optimization problem. In [30] , the authors formulated an equivalent optimization problem and proved the following results. These results are essential to formulate the cooperative game for solving the EATA problem.
Theorem 2 (Concavity) [30] . Let g: X ! < þ nf0g be a concave function, where < þ is the set of non-negative real numbers. Then, h ¼ lnðgðÁÞÞ: X ! < is concave. If g is 1-1, then h is strictly concave.
Theorem 3 (Problem transformation) [26] and [30] . Suppose that for each j 2 J; f j : X ! <, is 1-1 on X Ã . Under the assumption of Theorem 1, we consider the following:
1. Equation (10) has a unique solution and the bargaining solution is a single point. 2. Equation (11) is a convex optimization problem and has a unique solution. 3. Equations (10) and (11) are equivalent. 4. The unique solution of (11) is the bargaining solution.
The advantage of this transformation is that the complexity of (11) is considerably lower, and it always guarantees NBS. The complexity is an extremely important issue, as it increases with the increase in the number of players. For instance, for a two-player cooperative game the NBS is a twodimensional point, for a three-player cooperative game, the NBS resides inside a three-dimensional triangle, for a fourplayer cooperative game, the NBS resides inside a fourdimensional rectangle, and so on. Unless we have a definitive way to calculate the Bargaining Point, computing an NBS is not useful. Hence, it is essential for us to 1) mold our problem formulation to carry an optimization function that is of the form of (11) and 2) find an efficient technique to identify the Bargaining Point.
GAME THEORETICAL EATA
In this section, we convert the EATA problem into a cooperative game theory problem. Next, we convert the minimization problem into a maximization problem that adheres to the form expressed in (11).
Transforming the Problem into the Max-Max-Min Problem
We consider the system model described in Section 3. The cooperative game presented here considers each machine in the computational grid as a player. The goal of the players is to execute task in a manner that reduces the overall makespan of the metatask, while keeping the instantaneous power consumption to its minimum. If p ij is the instantaneous power consumed and t ij is the time taken by machine j to execute task i, then the objective of the cooperative game is to minimize both p ij and t ij . We can express this cooperative game ðCG 1 Þ as
p ij x ij and minimize max
t ij x ij subject to (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and
The conservation condition of (12) states that the instantaneous power allocated is bounded. Clearly, the instantaneous power consumption has to be a positive number, as in (13) . These constraints make the EATA problem convex that in turn makes the optimization problem tractable. This is because, as reported in [26] and [30] , if the optimization problem is concave, then there are possibly exponential number of bargaining solutions for the optimization problem.
In transforming the problem, the above cooperative game (CG1) is equivalent to the following cooperative game (CG2):
ðÀp ij x ij Þ and maximize min 1jm X n i¼1 ðÀt ij x ij Þ subject to (4), (5), (12) and From the above, we observe that each player has an objective f j ðxÞ ¼ Àp ij . Now, assume that all players are able to achieve performance strictly superior to the initial performance, that is, the set J ¼ M. The initial performance of player j is given by 0 j . This corresponds to the peak instantaneous power consumption of the machine j. This will always be an agreeable point because this is the minimum acceptable performance, but another NBS with greater performance is desired by reducing the instantaneous power as much as possible. The initial agreement point focuses on the power consumption because power is given preference over makespan in the EATA problem. Moreover, power and makespan are inversely proportional. Therefore, if peak power is an agreement point, then the smallest makespan is also an agreement point.
Theorem 4 (NBS-EATA). The NBS for the cooperative EATA game is determined by solving the following:
Àt ij x ij subject to (4), (5), (6'), (7'), (8'), (12) , and (13).
Proof. In Theorem 1, we consider f j ð j Þ ¼ Àp ij , which is concave and bounded above. This guarantees a solution to the above problem but with a higher complexity. The set, X, determined by the constraint is convex and compact. The conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied. Using Theorem 1 and the fact that f j ð j Þ ¼ Àp ij are 1-1 functions of p ij , if we apply Theorem 2, then the results follow. t u For our cooperative game, we first solve the optimization problem given in Theorem 4. Note that because the instantaneous power regulates the time to complete a task, it is sufficient to utilize power as the only tunable variable in the subsequent proofs. Utilizing power and time together would result in similar bounds; however, the proofs would have been complicated.
Theorem 5 (NBS without the conservation condition).
The solution of the optimization problem in Theorem 4 is given by
Proof. The constraints in the Theorem 4 are linear in j , and f j ð j Þ ¼ Àp ij has continuous first partial derivatives. This implies that the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions [12] are necessary and sufficient for optimality [19] . Let 0, j 0, j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; m, denote the Lagrange multipliers [12] , [20] , which is
The first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given in (16) and (17), with a constraint given in (18):
If j À p ij ¼ 0, then the current instantaneous power consumption is the best instantaneous power utility. If j À p ij > 0, i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n, j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; m, then j ¼ 0, i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n, j ¼ 1; . . . ; m. The solution (derivative) of (16) and (17) is given in (19) and (20) , respectively:
It then follows that
Because f j ð j Þ ¼ Àp ij and due to symmetry (Theorems 1 and 2), f j ð j Þ ¼ p ij . Thus, we replace j with p ij .
For a particular j, the cooperation is between the player j and the rest of m À 1 players. Therefore,
This completes the proof. t u
Theoretically, the NBS is achieved, but the solution is impractical because it promotes the assignment of negative instantaneous power, which is undesirable as no machine will be willing to execute any task. Thus, in reality, we can never use this solution, because instantaneous power consumption can never be negative. Therefore, we transform the problem with the instantaneous power conservation condition of (13) . This means that all machines other than machine j are running with their maximum frequencies. In such case, we make the solution feasible by setting p ij ¼ 0 and not assign any task to machine j. However, this can lead to machines getting out of the competition, which is undesirable because it can cause a cascaded shut down of the entire system.
As a next step in obtaining the solution for our cooperative game, we solve the optimization problem with the help of the results from Theorem 4 that incorporates the condition of (13) . This implies that machines stay in the system with adjusted utilities having relatively lower individual payoffs but a higher collective payoff.
Theorem 6 (NBS with the conservation condition). If
then the objective function from Theorem 4 is maximized, subject to the constraint of (13) and when 1 ! 2 ! . . . ! m holds.
Proof. We add a new condition to the first-order KuhnTucker conditions, as given in (16), (17), and the constraint given by (18) . The new set of conditions is the (25) , (26) , and (27) , and the constraint is given in (28):
From (28), we gather that
We have j À p ij > 0, i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n, j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; m. This implies that j ¼ 0, i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; n, j ¼ 1; . . . ; m. The solution of (25), (26), and (27) is given in (30), (31), and (32), respectively:
But, we know from (29) and (32) that the value of m can either be zero or positive. Otherwise, the conservation condition given in (13) will not hold. Case1. If m > 0, then the solution of the first-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions is
By the arguments presented earlier for (23), (33) transforms to the following:
Case 2. If m ¼ 0, then this can only happen when
Equation (35) cannot hold because we are considering the case of m ¼ 0, and we already know that m < 0 cannot hold. This implies that
Equation (36) will disregard m for task allocation and move to machine mÀ1 , which will bring in a higher benefit to the system. The process will continue until (36) is violated and that will be the solution. t u
Now, assume that the machines in the computational grid are sorted in a decreasing order of their current instantaneous power consumption. Given such a list, we assign a task to the machine that is currently running on an instantaneous power just above the weighted average instantaneous power consumption. The assignment warrants adjusting the instantaneous power consumption to the appropriate DVS level DVS ¼ fdvs 1 ; dvs 2 ; . . . dvs l g such that the machine can guarantee the deadline associated with the task. This procedure is applied until a feasible solution is found.
The Algorithm for NBS-EATA
Based on Theorems 5 and 6, we derive an algorithm (called NBS-EATA) for obtaining NBS for the cooperative EATA game. The goal of the NBS-EATA algorithm is to reduce the instantaneous power consumption for the execution of tasks (constrained by their deadlines) so as to minimize the overall energy consumption. The pseudocode for NBS-EATA is depicted in Fig. 1 .
Theorem 7 (Correctness of the NBS-EATA).
The instantaneous power adjustments, pijs, computed by the NBS-EATA technique solve the optimization problem in Theorem 4.
Proof. The while loop in
Step 4a finds the minimum index m for which
If jJj ¼ jMj, then it means that all j s are positive. Applying Theorem 6 and the proof follows. If jJj < jMj (which may be the most probable case), then we get
when j s are sorted as 1 ! 2 ! . . . ! jJj . From Theorem 6 Case 2, we know that jJj 6 ¼ 0. Also, we know that NBS-EATA will not allocate any tasks to jJj in the while loop. Applying Theorem 5 and the proof follows. Now, the only argument that we need to be concerned with is the integrity of the while loop. That can be answered by showing that at any given instance, the while loop always produces a task to machine assignment that is covered by Theorem 6. By definition, the while loop if stopped at an instance where the first k machines were dealt with, then those k machines will correspond to the k fastest machines that bare the instantaneous power consumption of 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; k . But, we know from Theorem 6 that a machine j's best strategy is
Equation (39) transforms into (40) from the arguments presented earlier for (22) :
The execution of NBS-EATA technique is in Oðnm logðmÞÞ. The complexity is determined by observing that Step 2 in Fig. 1 takes OðmlogðmÞÞ.
Step 2, which is enclosed in Step 1, takes OðnÞ. This polynomial time complexity is possible because the objective functions are convex; however, in general, determining an NBS is an NP-hard problem [19] . We now elaborate on how NBS-EATA caters for some extreme cases of mapping tasks to machines.
Realistic penalization of task deadlines. The NBS-EATA judicially selects a machine that is best suitable to execute the current task. The main objective of the NBS-EATA technique is to map tasks to machines such that the selected machine 1) can fulfill the deadline constraints of the assigned task and 2) can possibly lower its DVS in order to save instantaneous power. It can be observed that the NBS-EATA technique in majority of the mappings does not choose the machine that is either power hungry or power starved. In essence (keeping in view that the average instantaneous power of all the machines change after a mapping of a single task), it selects the machine that is just right above the average instantaneous power of all the machines in the system, leaving the high-powered machines for larger tasks and low-powered machines for smaller tasks. Deadlock avoidance. The NBS-EATA will resolve deadlocks in Step 4b by lowering its selection criteria ðp av Þ to extend the possible solution space to incorporate machine that are running at higher power than the originally computed average power of all the machines. It is also clear from the above discussion ("realistic penalization of task deadlines") that if the current machine is not capable of executing the task, a high-powered machine will be chosen. If that high-powered machine cannot execute the task, then the next high-powered machine will be chosen and so on.
Possibility of vertical allocations. The NBS-EATA technique is not biased toward vertical allocations; unless, the workload is extremely skewed (i.e., tasks have extremely tight deadlines). In that case, there can be no mapping heuristic that can handle such a situation [5] , because a heuristic will always choose the machine that is the fastest among all machines and eventually violate the deadline constraints [32] . In every research study in the field of resource allocation that is published, the workload is carefully chosen and is labeled balanced in terms of constraints associated with the problem domain. Now, if the workload is balanced, the NBS-EATA technique will map tighter deadline constrained tasks to high-powered machines, looser deadline constrained to low-powered machines, and medium deadline constrained tasks to medium-powered machines.
An Illustrative Example
Suppose we are given a metatask comprising of six tasks t 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t 6 and three machines m 1 , m 2 , and m 3 each with four DVS levels. We assume that the machines have the following characteristics:
First, we solve the above example using the classical Nash axiomatic technique [14] . This technique iteratively builds an NBS and thereafter identifies a Bargaining Point. Next, we show the same example by using the proposed NBS-EATA method.
The classical Nash axiomatic technique requires revisiting the linearity axiom (Definition 2, Axiom 1). Let x, y, and z be the valuations of m 1 , m 2 , and m 3 , respectively. Due to [12] , the linearity axiom restricts the utility benefit (objective) functions for the three machines to the following form: V m1 ðxÞ ¼ maximizeðxÞ; minimizeðy þ zÞ, V m2 ðyÞ ¼ maximizeðyÞ; minimizeðx þ zÞ, and V m3 ðzÞ ¼ maximizeðzÞ; minimizeðx þ yÞ. Because in the classical Nash axiomatic technique, the objective functions were termed utility function, we continue to use that terminology. The utility function of the machines in the classical Nash axiomatic method has two components p ij and t ij , each negating the effect of the other. Because our problem is to minimize the instantaneous power such that the task execution time is bounded by constraints of deadlines, the utility function becomes p ij À t ij . Because p ij is cubed inversely proportional to t ij , the unity function becomes p ij À t À3 ij . It is noteworthy to mention that in the classical Nash axiomatic technique both objectives (instantaneous power and makespan) are explicitly considered. In contrast, the NBS-EATA technique only seems to consider optimizing the instantaneous power. However, recall that by using the Lagrangian, we are simultaneously optimizing both of the objectives but because the objective of minimizing the instantaneous power is given preference, the NBS-EATA technique identifies the Bargaining Point as that machine, which is just below the average of all machines' current instantaneous power.
The net aggregate utility (AU) benefit of machine m j , AUm j ðDVSÞ, is defined according to the classical Nash axiomatic technique as the difference between the current utility and the utility when the machine is running on full instantaneous power, with the exception that a machine running on full instantaneous power will have its AU equivalent to the current utility; this exception is known as the initial agreement point.
The goal of the machines is to increase their benefits using the AU. We first compute all the AUs for t 1 , which requires 2 Â 10 9 computational cycles. Running t 1 on m 1 would take 4 seconds because the speed of m 1 is 0.5 GHz. The instantaneous power that m 1 will operate on in order to execute t 1 will be equivalent to 0.1250 W, when assuming that 1 V generates a frequency of 1 GHz in a CMOS circuit. (We understand that this is a very generic assumption, however, altering any of the values will have no bearing on the outcome of the example. Moreover, the purpose of this example is to show how effective is the proposed NBS-EATA technique compared to the classical game theoretical techniques.) The utility of m 1 would be equal to 0.1094. These calculations are repeated for each DVS level by all machines (see Table 1 ).
Using the values in Table 1 , the machines proceed with the classical Nash axiomatic technique by calculating their relative benefits. For instance, m 1 's benefit is AU m1 ð100Þ À ½AU m2 ð100Þ þ AU m3 ð100Þ ¼ À12:8922, where AU m1 ð100Þ denotes m 1 's AU when running at DVS level 100 percent. m 2 's benefit is AU m2 ð100Þ À ½AU m1 ð100Þ þAU m2 ð100Þ ¼ À1:1078, and so on. As AUs increase with the decrease in the DVS levels, the machines calculate their utility benefits as follows: For the next iteration, if the current benefit is negative or is less than previously obtained benefit, then the machines compute their benefits at a DVS level lower than the current one; otherwise, the DVS level is not altered. If the machines are at their lowest DVS level, then for the next iteration, the DVS level is chosen based on the previously known benefits (in the decreasing order). Table 2 shows these calculations. Notice the arrowheads that depict the change in the DVS level for the next iteration, as an increase ð"Þ, decrease ð#Þ, or maintain ð$Þ. The alterations in the DVS levels conclude when no further improvement is possible in any machine's AU. Table 2 depicts this phenomenon by reporting identical AUs in iterations 19 and 20.The game stops with the NBS if there can be no more improvement in the relative benefit of any machine. The final DVS alteration leaves machines m 1 , m 2 , and m 3 at a DVS level of 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent, respectively. t1 is assigned to the machine that has the highest utility benefit compared to the other two machines at the final DVS alteration. In Table 2 , we can observe that this is m 3 , which has the highest utility benefit of 0.9027 (last row). m 3 adjusts its DVS to a level where it can successfully run the task within the specified deadline and the procedure continues. This classical method runs twenty iterations to identify a Bargaining Point for t 1 . Figs. 2 and 3 show the corresponding instantaneous power levels and execution time alterations of the machines for task t1. Fig. 4 shows the utilities of the machines. Fig. 5 depicts the relative benefits acquired by the machines as an The classical Nash axiomatic technique is a very time consuming and tedious process to compute the Bargaining Point. By using the NBS-EATA, in each iteration, a task is assigned to a machine, thereby taking only six iteration as opposed to 20 when using the classical Nash axiomatic technique. When all the assignments are made, a solution (NBS) to the EATA problem is obtained. NBS-EATA constructs an iterative solution; hence, iteratively, the solution is complete and converges to a Bargaining Point (Theorems 4, 6, and 7).
SIMULATIONS, RESULTS, AND DISCUSSION
The simulation study used real task sets (explained in the subsequent text). We set forth two major goals for our simulation study: 1) To measure and compare the performance of NBS-EATA against the optimal solution, the greedy heuristic [31] , and the linear relaxation (LR) heuristic [31] . 2) To measure the impact of system parameter variations such as the increase in workload. We choose to compare the NBS-EATA technique against the above two heuristics because they have shown to perform extremely well compared to several other heuristics [31] . Now, we briefly describe the two techniques.
Greedy heuristic. The greedy heuristic is an extension of the highly cited min-min heuristic [4] . The heuristic is modified so that the overall energy dissipation of the system is minimized. The heuristic starts with a set U of unassigned tasks. In the first step, for each unassigned task, the heuristic finds the machine that will execute the task with minimal energy consumption. In the second step, it selects the (task, machine) pair among the pairs found in step 1 that consumes the minimum energy. The task of the selected pair is queued for execution at the machine of the selected pair. The task is removed from the set U and step 1 is invoked.
LR heuristic. The LR heuristic takes as input a GAP and outputs a task to machine mapping. The basic idea of the LR heuristic is treat the mapping assignment as one-tree (trees with one extra edge, possibly a slack edge, forming a cycle) search structure. This search is done over a bipartite graph of tasks and machines. The LR heuristic starts with one pair of bipartite nodes matching. It then continuously adds another single task to machine mapping and alternate all current mappings to find a feasible task to machine mapping that consumes the least amount of energy. Because the input to the LR heuristic is a GAP (our EATA problem formulation also is a GAP formulation), energy constraints and the rest of the constraints are automatically considered.
Based on the size of the problems, the simulations were divided in two parts. For small-size problems, we used an Integer Linear Programming tool called LINDO [22] . LINDO is useful to obtain optimal solutions, provided that the problem size is relatively small. Hence, for small problem sizes, the relative performance of the NBS-EATA, greedy, and LR techniques is compared against the LINDO implementation. For large-size problems, it becomes impractical to compute the optimal solution using LINDO. Fig. 3 . Execution time alterations of the machines for task t 1 . Fig. 2 . Instantaneous power adjustments of the machines for task t 1 . Fig. 4 . The utilities of the machines at each iteration using the classical Nash axiomatic technique. Fig. 5 . The relative benefits of the machines at each iteration using the classical Nash axiomatic technique.
Hence, we consider comparisons only against the greedy and LR heuristics.
For the workload, we acquired the data from the US Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN). The data is publicly available in [27] . The AFSCN is currently responsible for coordinating communications between civilian and military organization and more than 100 USAF managed satellites. The satellite-ground communications are performed using 16 antennas located at nine tracking stations around the globe. Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the data. We will refer to the problems in 1992 as the A problems and to the more recent problems, as the R problems.
Customer organizations submit task requests to reserve an antenna at a tracking station for a specified period of time based on the visibility windows between target satellites and tracking stations. There are two types of task requests that can be distinguished: 1) low-altitude orbits and 2) high-altitude orbits. The low altitude tasks specify requests for low-altitude satellites; such requests tend to be very short (on the average they are 5-10 minutes in duration) and have a tight visibility window (simply because the relative velocity of low altitude satellites is very high compared to high-altitude satellites). Highaltitude tasks specify requests for high-altitude satellites; the durations for these requests are more varied and usually longer, with large visibility windows. From real problem data, we extract a description of the problem specification in terms of task requests to be processed with their corresponding type (low or high altitude), duration, time window, and alternative resources. The real problem data also includes several problem parameters, e.g., satellite revolution, optional site equipment, tracking system maintenance times or downtimes, and the number of retry requests when the original request was lost due to atmospheric anomalies. We consider the incorporation of such information as beyond the scope of this research.
A problem instance of AFSCN consists of n task requests. Each task request t i , 1 i n, specifies a required processing duration (i.e., the time to complete a task) and the associated data file (i.e., the amount of memory required to process a task). Each task request also specifies a number of 1 j 16 pairs of the form ðt i ; m j Þ, each identifying a particular alternative resource (i.e., an antenna or, in our context, a machine m j ) and time window, i.e., the deadline for a task d i . The deadlines for low altitude tasks were relatively tighter than high altitude tasks. The processing duration of the task is the same for all possible alternative resources, and it needs to be mapped to a resource and completed within the time window. For each task, only one of the antennas needs to be chosen; also, the tasks cannot be preempted once a mapping is performed. This is predominantly because the system is oversubscribed. Finally, to model the DVS modules, we make the generic assumption the task processing time was given when a machine was running at full instantaneous power or at a level of DVS equal to 100 percent. Because the task processing time, as given in the AFSCN data, is uniform across all machines, for this problem instance, we assume that the machines have a clock speed of 2 GHz. We also assume that a potential difference of 1 mV across a CMOS circuit generates a frequency of 1 MHz. Altering any of these assumptions will be a trivial task and will have no significant impact on the simulation results. For this study, we keep the architectural affinity requirements confined to memory. Adding other requirements such as, I/O, processor type, etc. will bear no affect on our simulation setup or theoretical results. In all of the simulation setups, the capacity (in terms of memory) of the machines was set proportional to the total size of data items (TS). The capacity of a mobile server is generated using a uniform distribution from (0.5 Â TS) and (1.5 Â TS).
For small-size problems, the number of machines was fixed at 5, while the number of tasks varied from 5 to 50. The tasks were chosen on random from each of the 12 days of the AFSCN workload and the simulation plot is an average over the 12 runs. The number of DVS levels per machine was set to 4. For large-size problems, the number of machines was fixed at 16, while the number of tasks varied from 322 to 4,370. The bound of the number of tasks reflect the sequential aggregation of the tasks in the AFSN workload, i.e., for the first set, we use the data from 10/12/ 92 having 322 tasks, for the second set, we use the data as the aggregate of the data of 10/12/92 (322 tasks) and 10/ 13/92 (302 tasks), giving us a total of 624 tasks, and so on. The number of DVS levels per m j was set to 8. Other parameters were kept the same as those for small-size problems.
Comparative results. The simulation results for smallsize problems with are reported in Figs. 6 and 7. These figures show the ratio of the makespan obtained from the three techniques and the optimal. The plot in Fig. 6 shows that the NBS-EATA performs extremely well by achieves a makespan within 10 percent of the optimal solution. Next, we compare the overall energy consumption of the optimal solution, NBS-EATA, greedy, and LR techniques.
The energy consumption as mentioned earlier is calculated as the time interval a task takes to complete on a given machine multiplied by the current instantaneous power of the given machine. In Fig. 7 , we observe that once again, the NBS-EATA technique outperforms the other techniques in terms of energy savings compared to the optimal task allocation within a range of 15 percent. For large problem instances, first, we compare the makespan identified by the NBS-EATA, greedy, and LR heuristics. Fig. 8 shows the performance of the techniques. The results indicate that NBS-EATA outperforms greedy and LR heuristics in identifying a smaller makespan. Second, we compare the energy consumption of the three techniques. Fig. 9 shows the relative performance of the techniques. NBS-EATA again outperforms the other heuristics by consuming lesser energy when executing the tasks.
To further illustrate the effectiveness of the NBS-EATA technique, Figs. 10 and 11 show the average makespan and the average overall energy consumed, respectively, over all of the large-size problem scenarios. It can be seen that the NBS-EATA technique identifies a makespan that is 22.78 percent smaller than greedy and 29.64 percent smaller than LR heuristic. Moreover, the NBS-EATA technique saves on average 24.35 percent of energy than the greedy and 50.69 percent of energy than the LR heuristic, respectively. Last, we analyze the runtime for both small and large problem sizes. For completion, the runtime of the optimal for small problem size is presented for comparisons. Moreover, we also include the runtime of the classical Nash axiomatic technique described in Section 5.3 that was implemented in Matlab. We did not show the results of the classical Nash axiomatic technique for makespan and energy consumption, because it always produces the same allocation as that of the NBS-EATA technique. This analogy can be deduced from Section 5.3. The results are depicted in Tables 4 and 5 . The NBS-EATA technique terminates many orders faster than the optimal, classical Nash axiomatic technique, greedy heuristic, and LR heuristic.
CONCLUSION
This paper presented an energy optimizing power-aware resource allocation strategy in computational grids for multiple tasks. The problem was formulated as an extension of the GAP. A solution from cooperative game theory based on the concept of NBS (NBS-EATA) was proposed for this problem. We proved through rigorous mathematical proofs that the proposed NBS-EATA can guarantee Pareto optimal solutions in mere Oðnm logðmÞÞ time (where n is the number of tasks, and m is the number of machines in the system). The solution quality of the NBS-EATA was compared against the optimal for small-scale problems, and greedy and linear relaxation (LR) heuristics for large-scale problems. The simulation results confirm superior performance of the proposed scheme in terms of reduction in energy consumption and makespan compared to the comparative heuristics and the optimal solution obtained using LINDO.
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